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On 11 January, Croatia will hold a second round of voting to elect the country’s next President.
Višeslav Raos provides a comprehensive preview of the vote, noting that the elections are
expected to give a clear indication of how the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections might go
later in the year.
On 11 January, Croatian voters will decide whether the country’s incumbent President, Social
Democrat Ivo Josipović (57), a law professor and composer of classical music, will retain his post or
have to pass the baton to Christian Democrat Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (46), former Minister of
European Aﬀairs, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO (the
ﬁrst woman to hold a senior post in the Alliance).
In the ﬁrst round of the election, held on 28 December, Josipović gained some 20 thousand more votes than his
main challenger Grabar-Kitarović, leaving behind a 25-year old Eurosceptic activist against home evictions, Ivan
Vilibor Sinčić, and national conservative physician Milan Kujundžić. The Table below shows the result of the ﬁrst
round of voting.









Party of Croatia (SDP). For more information on the other parties see: Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ), Human Wall, and Alliance for Croatia. Vote percentages are rounded to one
decimal place and number of votes to nearest hundred.
Never was a presidential election in Croatia such a close-run challenge. During the 1990s, Croatia had a semi-
presidential system, with presidential executive powers similar to those of its French counterpart. Franjo Tuđman
won both elections (1992, 1997) in the ﬁrst round, leaving his challengers behind with large margins (almost 34.9
per cent in 1992 and 40.4 per cent in 1997).
His successor, Stjepan Mesić, saw his presidential powers reduced due to constitutional changes in 2000 and the
transformation towards a parliamentary system. Although winning both elections only after a runoﬀ, Mesić also
defeated his competitors by sizeable margins – in 2000 he had a 13.4 point advantage in the ﬁrst round and just
over a 12 point advantage in the second round, while in 2005 he won the ﬁrst round with a 28.6 per cent margin and
the second round with just under a 31.9 per cent margin. Josipović won his ﬁrst term by a lead of over 17.6 per cent
in the ﬁrst round and just over 20.5 per cent in the second round.
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As the Chart below shows, presidential elections in Croatia are clearly second-order elections, attracting less than
half of the electorate to voting stations and deciding who will enter an oﬃce with only limited powers in foreign and
security policy. However, the two main political blocs – the centre-left, gathered around the Social Democratic Party
(SDP, Party of European Socialists member) and the centre-right, grouped around the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ, European People’s Party member) – view them as midterm elections. The outcome of this Sunday’s poll is
expected to indicate whether the pendulum of Croatia’s electorate will swing to the left or to the right at the upcoming
parliamentary elections, likely to be held in December 2015.
Chart: Turnout in ﬁrst round of Croatian presidential elections (1992 – 2014)
Note: This chart was generated using the Political Data Yearbook: Interactive (part of the
European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook) available online at
http://politicaldatayearbook.com
The candidates
The reelection bid of president Josipović (former SDP member, now oﬃcially independent, as he is constitutionally
barred from being a party member while in oﬃce) is supported by the four government parties – SDP, social liberal
Croatian People’s Party-Liberal Democrats (HNS) and regionalist liberal Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) (both
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe members), as well as the single-issue Croatian Party of Pensioners
(HSU). Other parliamentary parties that support his candidacy include the opposition left-wing Croatian Labourists –
Labour Party (European United Left – Nordic Green Left) and the green alternative Croatian Sustainable
Development party (OraH) (European Green Party). Major watchdog and human rights advocacy NGOs in the
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country support the incumbent. He also has unoﬃcial backing by many mainstream journalists. Former president
Stjepan Mesić (2000-2010) has endorsed Josipović as well.
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović enjoys the support of a wide centre right coalition, which includes not just HDZ, but also the
agrarian Croatian Peasant Party (HSS, European People’s Party), the conservative liberal Croatian Social Liberal
Party (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe member), as well as several small national conservative
parties. The Catholic Church, as well as several Christian non-governmental organisations have also given her
strong informal support. War veterans, as well the vast majority of voters living abroad also overwhelmingly support
her presidential bid. Furthermore, senior oﬃcials of the European People’s Party have endorsed Grabar-Kitarović.
The campaigns
Ivo Josipović has run his campaign on a platform of constitutional reform. Although he has not yet publicised his
exact proposals for constitutional amendments, he has emphasised several aspects, including legislative veto
powers for the President, regionalisation of the country, and a new electoral system that would elect half of MPs
through a ﬁrst-past-the-post system, while the other half would be elected on party lists through preferential voting.
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović has consistently attempted to make Josipović accountable for the poor economic record of
the government, led by his fellow Social Democrat Zoran Milanović. She opposes constitutional reform and larger
presidential powers. Instead, Grabar-Kitarović asserts that Josipović has not made use of existing powers during his
ﬁrst term. Thus, she maintains that he should have used his constitutional right to call for an extraordinary
government meeting on pressing social and economic issues in Croatia. Besides that, she has heavily criticised
Josipović’s policy towards Serbia, claiming that he has not managed to resolve any outstanding bilateral issues,
especially the question of Croatian citizens who went missing during the war. This is part of a larger policy
disagreement between HDZ and SDP, where HDZ politicians maintain that the Social Democrats focus too much on
the ex-Yugoslav neighbourhood and neglect strategic relations with Western allies such as Germany and the United
States.
There are three main features of the second round campaign. First, both candidates have regularly discussed issues
that are outside of presidential powers, but which instead sit within the domain of the government. Long years of
recession have led Croatian voters to expect the President to ensure a “better life”, i.e. to work towards economic
recovery and social cohesion. Thus, the media often pushes both candidates to focus their campaigns on unrealistic
social and economic promises. The emphasis on social and economic issues also reﬂects the wish of both
candidates to lure protest voters who cast their ballots for Sinčić in the ﬁrst round. However, Sinčić has called his
voters to abstain from elections or to write in his name on the ballots, rendering them invalid.
Second, both the centre left and the centre right bloc have portrayed the presidential election as a fundamental
decision about the future course of the whole of Croatian society. This includes a great deal of scaremongering.
Supporters of Josipović maintain that he must win in order to prevent the return of HDZ to government and they have
placed great emphasis on the purported connection of the present HDZ leadership and its candidate with the former
party leader and prime minister (2003-2009) Ivo Sanader, who is currently serving a prison sentence for high-level
corruption. Alternatively, supporters of Grabar-Kitarović have said that she must win in order to prevent the “Reds”
(Social Democrats) from reshaping the country according to their fashion, underlining the communist past of the
current president and his co-workers, as well as their rather positive views of the Yugoslav period.
Third, the tone of the last leg of the campaign has become much harsher than it was in the initial period of
campaigning. This has included personal smears over social networks and numerous attempts to discredit the other
side by leaking supposedly controversial information to friendly journalists. In addition, Grabar-Kitarović has been a
target of several sexist comments by high-ranking Social Democrats, including the Prime Minister.
The mobilisation capacity of the two main parties will no doubt have a decisive impact on the ﬁnal election result.
While HDZ has a massive party organisation, the SDP functions as a cadre party, maintaining a small, elite
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membership. Thus, Grabar-Kitarović might expect a greater boost in support from a stronger presence of party
members on the ground. An unexpected heavy snow blizzard on the day of the ﬁrst round prevented many people
from casting their votes. While some analysts claim that the expected larger turnout in the second round will favour
Josipović, others have noted that foul weather in the ﬁrst round mostly aﬀected elderly voters in rural areas who
generally support Grabar-Kitarović.
Ultimately, if Josipović stays in oﬃce, this will help the highly unpopular Milanović cabinet to stay in power, avoid
early elections, and delay intraparty struggles among the Social Democrats. However if Grabar-Kitarović wins the
election, this will pave the way to a HDZ-led government after the parliamentary elections, just as Josipović’s
success in 2010 meant the downfall of Jadranka Kosor (HDZ Prime Minister from 2009 to 2011) and enabled
Milanović’s sweeping 2011 victory.
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